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ABSTRACT 
We investigate whether hospitals in the English National Health Service change their quality 
or efficiency in response to changes in quality or efficiency of neighbouring hospitals. We 
first provide a theoretical model which predicts that a hospital will not respond to changes in 
the efficiency of its rivals but may change its quality or efficiency in response to changes in 
the quality of rivals, though the direction of the response is ambiguous. We use data on eight 
quality measures (including mortality, emergency readmissions, patient reported outcome, 
and patient satisfaction) and six efficiency measures (including bed occupancy, cancelled 
operations, and costs) for public hospitals between 2010/11 and 2013/14 to estimate both 
spatial cross-sectional and spatial fixed and random effects panel data models. We find that 
although quality and efficiency measures are unconditionally spatially correlated, the spatial 
regression models suggest that DKRVSLWDO¶VTXDOLW\RUHIILFiency does not respond to its rivals¶ 
TXDOLW\RUHIILFLHQF\H[FHSW IRUDKRVSLWDO¶VRYHUDOOPRUWDOLW\ZKLFKLVSRVLWLYHO\DVVRFLDWHG
with that of its rivals. The results are robust to allowing for spatially correlated covariates and 
spatial correlated errors and to LQVWUXPHQWLQJULYDOV¶TXDOLW\DQGHIILFLHQF\ 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Quality and efficiency are fundamental goals for policymakers in the hospital sector. In the 
presence of fixed prices, policymakers have argued that competition may induce hospitals to 
compete on quality to attract patients and to enhance their efficiency (Gaynor, 2007). 
Investigations of the effect of competition on quality and efficiency in the US, the United 
Kingdom, and other OECD countries have produced mixed results (section 1.1). 
In this study, rather than examining the relationship between measures of competition and 
hospital quality and efficiency, we use an alternative approach by examining hospitals¶ 
strategic interactions. For example, in a competitive environment we may expect a hospital to 
respond to an increase in quality by a rival hospital by also increasing quality: in industrial 
economics terms qualities are strategic complements. We present a simple theory model 
(Section 2) which shows that this intuition can be correct if treatment costs are increasing in 
TXDOLW\7KHUHGXFWLRQ LQGHPDQGZKLFKIROORZV IURPDQ LQFUHDVH LQ ULYDO¶VTXDOLW\ UHGXFHV
total treatment cost of providing quality and at the margin incentivises the hospital to increase 
quality. There is however an offsetting effect: the reduction in quality also reduces incentives 
to contain cost which reduces the profit margin on additional patients. We therefore 
investigate empirically whether quality and efficiency are strategic complements or strategic 
substitutes so that higher ULYDOV¶TXDOLW\ (efficiency) induces a hospital to increase or reduce 
its quality (efficiency). 
We consider both clinical and non-clinical dimensions of quality. We measure clinical 
quality through risk-adjusted overall mortality and readmission rate, and mortality rates for 
high-volume conditions such as hip fracture and stroke. Since the vast majority of patients do 
not die or have an emergency readmission we also measure health gains for a common 
elective procedure (hip replacement) using patients-reported outcomes (PROMs). We capture 
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non-clinical dimensions of patients¶ experience using patient satisfaction with their overall 
hospital experience, hospital cleanliness, and the extent to which clinicians involved the 
patients in the treatment decision. We measure hospital efficiency through indicators for bed 
occupancy, cancelled elective operations, and cost indices for overall hospital activity, 
elective and non-elective activity, and for hip replacement. All these measures are in the 
public domain so that hospital managers and senior physicians are in principle able to 
compare themselves with their rivals. 
The global Moran¶V , WHVW suggests that most of the quality and efficiency indicators are 
unconditionally spatially correlated. We estimate spatial cross-sectional models by 
quasi-maximum likelihood (ML) controlling for observable determinants of quality and 
efficiency. To control for unobserved time-invariant determinants of quality and efficiency, 
we also estimate spatial panel models with hospital fixed or random effects. These models 
VXJJHVW WKDW D KRVSLWDO¶V TXDOLW\ RU HIILFLHQF\ GRHV QRW UHVSRQG WR LWV ULYDOV¶ quality or 
HIILFLHQF\H[FHSWIRUDKRVSLWDO¶VRYHUDOOPRUWDOLW\ZKLFKLVSRVLWLYHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKDWRI
its rivals. The results are robust to allowing for spatially correlated covariates and spatially 
correlated errors and to LQVWUXPHQWLQJULYDOV¶TXality and efficiency. 
Sections 1.1 and 1.2 review the literature and the institutional background. Section 2 
provides a simple theoretical model. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 4 
describes the data. Section 5 discusses the results, and Section 6 concludes. 
1.1. Related literature 
Our study contributes to the literature on hospital competition and, more broadly, to spatial 
econometrics applications in health economics. Early studies focus on the relationship 
between hospital competition and efficiency in the US. They show that non-price competition 
combined with a cost-based reimbursement system may lead to overprovision of hospital 
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services (e.g. Joskow, 1980, Robinson and Luft, 1985). Later studies find a beneficial effect 
of price competition on costs (e.g. Zwanziger and Melnick, 1988, Bamezai et al., 1999). 
Studies on the impact of hospital competition on clinical quality, measured usually by 
mortality, have mixed results. Some find that competition improves quality (Kessler and 
McClellan, 2000, Kessler and Geppert, 2005), others that competition reduces quality 
(Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003) or has no effect (Mukamel et al., 2001). 
UK studies also have mixed results. While some find that competition increases 
efficiency (Cooper et al., 2012, Gaynor et al., 2013) others report no association (Söderlund 
et al., 1997). Some studies find negative effects of competition on quality when prices are not 
fixed and negotiated with the purchaser (Propper et al., 2004, Propper et al., 2008); some later 
studies find positive effects where prices were fixed within a DRG type system (Cooper et 
al., 2011, Gaynor et al., 2013, Bloom et al., 2015), and some find mixed effects based on the 
quality indicator (Gravelle et al., 2014a). 
A smaller number of studies take a different approach: rather than examining the 
quasi-reduced form relationship between market structure and quality or price, they use 
spatial econometric methods to investigate strategic interactions amongst hospitals by 
H[DPLQLQJZKHWKHUDKRVSLWDO¶VTXDOLW\RUprice depends on the quality or price of its rivals. 
Mobley (2003) and Mobley et al. (2009) examine strategic complementarity in prices within 
the US context where hospital prices are not fixed. Similarly, Choné et al. (2014) study 
strategic complementarity of G3V¶ prices in France using an instrumental variables (IV) 
approach. Gravelle et al. (2014b) use a cross section of English data and find that four out of 
sixteen clinical and patient-reported hospital quality measures are strategic complements. 
We contribute to this literature in a number of ways. First, we complement the theory 
model in Brekke et al. (2012), which shows that competition can influence efficiency through 
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its effect on quality, and the finding in Cooper et al. (2012), which suggest that market 
structure affects efficiency, by examining strategic interactions amongst hospitals with 
respect to efficiency. Second, we employ panel data to control for unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity. Third, previous studies on strategic interactions amongst hospitals have been 
cross-sectional and so may be biased when estimated by ML because of unobserved factors 
generating spatial correlations amongst hospitals. We therefore address potential endogeneity 
in cross-sectional models by using an IV approach. 
More generally, our study contributes to the small but growing literature on spatial 
econometrics applications in health economics. As well as hospital competition, this literature 
discusses alternative sources of spatial dependence across healthcare authorities. Following 
Manski (1993), Moscone and Knapp (2005) propose a classification of spatial effects for 
mental health expenditure in England. More recently, Atella et al. (2014) investigate 
spillovers in healthcare expenditure amongst Italian local health authorities and Guccio and 
Lisi (2016) lRRNDWLQWHUDFWLRQVDPRQJVWKRVSLWDOV¶caesarean section rates. Another strand of 
this literature focuses on healthcare expenditure and its determinants. Some studies 
investigate whether spatial interactions affect expenditure (Moscone et al., 2007a, Moscone et 
al., 2007b). Other studies allow for spatial dependence to identify the effect of other factors, 
such as income, on healthcare expenditure (Costa-i-Font and Pons-Novell, 2007, Baltagi and 
Moscone, 2010, Moscone and Tosetti, 2010, Baltagi et al., 2016). Other studies show that it is 
necessary to allow for spatial correlations when examining the determinants on health 
outcomes, such as mortality (Lorant et al., 2001), avoidable emergency admissions (Mobley 
et al., 2006, Weeks et al., 2016), admission, discharge and treatment indicators (Bech and 
Lauridsen, 2008, Baltagi and Yen, 2014, Gaughan et al., 2015), and HIV prevalence rate 
(Docquier et al., 2014). 
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The present study extends the analysis by Gravelle et al. (2014b) on strategic interactions 
amongst English hospitals in several directions. In terms of research question, we focus on 
strategic interactions in efficiency in addition to quality. Gravelle et al. (2014b) use 
cross-sectional data from the financial year 2009/10 while our study covers the more recent 
and longer period from 2010/11 to 2013/14, which gives us the opportunity to exploit panel 
data methods. We also analyse quality indicators not included by Gravelle et al. (2014b), i.e. 
the PROMs for two high-volume orthopaedic procedures (hip and knee replacement). Most 
importantly, we employ a ML panel spatial lag model and a cross-sectional IV approach. We 
also use a richer set of demand and supply shifters to better account for potential factors 
generating spatial correlations. Our results are different but compatible with those obtained 
by Gravelle et al. (2014b) as discussed in greater detail in Section 5.3. 
1.2. Institutional background 
The English National Health Service (NHS) provides healthcare which is universal, tax 
financed, and free at the point of use. The Department of Health distributes capitated funding 
to around 150 local health authorities which use it to pay for secondary healthcare provided 
to NHS patients by public and private hospitals. Public hospitals are run by NHS Trusts or 
NHS Foundation Trusts, the latter having greater financial autonomy. Some NHS hospital 
trusts are teaching trusts providing research and teaching, and some are specialist trusts 
focusing on a limited range of conditions or client groups. 
Hospitals are mainly funded through a prospective payment system, the National Tariff 
Payment System. This is based on Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs), a patient 
classification system similar to the American Diagnosis-Related Group or DRG. The HRGs 
categorise patients into homogeneous groups depending on diagnoses, procedures, and some 
patient characteristics. A fixed tariff is calculated for each HRG group as its national cost 
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averaged across providers but with adjustments for individual hospitals to reflect exogenous 
variations in input prices and the higher costs of specialised care (Department of Health, 
2013). 
Hospital competition has been encouraged by UHOD[LQJUHVWULFWLRQVRQSDWLHQWV¶FKRLFHRI
hospital for elective care. Since 2008 patients have been allowed to choose any qualified 
provider (Department of Health, 2009). Choice is facilitated through the website µ1+6
&KRLFHV¶ZKLFKSURYLGHVLnformation on hospital performance (e.g. mortality, waiting times). 
 THEORETICAL MODEL 
We sketch a simple two-provider model of quality competition and cost reducing effort. 
Hospital i has demand function  ,i i jD q q  which is increasing in own quality iq  and 
decreasing in the quality of hospital j. The objective function of hospital i is: 
      , ; , ; , ;i i i i i i i j i i i i iU p c q e D q q G q eT T T  ª º¬ ¼  (1) 
where p is the fixed price per treatment that the hospital receives from a third-party payer. 
 ,i i ic q e  are variable treatment costs, which are increasing in quality and decreasing in 
cost-containment effort or efficiency ei.  ,i i iG q e  are monetary and non-monetary fixed costs 
which are increasing in both quality and cost-containment (managerial) effort. We assume 
that quality and cost-containment effort are substitutes, i.e.  , 0
i iiq e i i
G q e ! , since both are 
types of managerial effort. To keep computations simple, we assume that quality and 
efficiency are instead independent in variable costs, i.e.  , 0
i iiq e i i
c q e  . Ti is a vector of shift 
parameters (such as local input prices, population demographics, and morbidity). 
Hospital i chooses quality and efficiency to satisfy: 
      , ; ( , ; ) , ; ( , ; ) , ; 0
i i i iiq i i i i iq i j i iq i i i i i j i iq i i iU p c q e D q q c q e D q q G q eT T T T T     ª º¬ ¼  (2) 
      , ; , ; , ; 0
i i iie ie i i i i i j i ie i i iU c q e D q q G q eT T T     (3) 
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where 0
iiq
D ! , 0
iiq
c ! , and 0
iiq
G ! , and denote partial derivatives with respect to quality. 
With strictly concave utility functions these optimality conditions are also sufficient. Note 
that the price must exceed the marginal cost of treating additional patients if the hospital is to 
be induced to provide positive quality. The optimal quality is determined such that the 
marginal profit from higher additional demand is equal to the marginal cost of quality. The 
optimal level of efficiency (cost-containment effort) is such that the marginal benefit from 
lower costs and higher profits are equal to the marginal disutility from efficiency. 
 The first order conditions (2) and (3) define the reaction functions for hospital i¶V
quality and efficiency as functions of the choice of quality by hospital j: 
 
( ; )Ri i j iq q q T  (4) 
 
( ; )Ri i j ie e q T . (5) 
Since neither of the first order conditions depends on the efficiency of hospital j, it is 
apparent that quality and efficiency of hospital i are strategically independent of the 
efficiency of hospital j. 
Totally differentiating the first order conditions we obtain: 
 
^ ` 1
1
?
[( ) ]
i j i i i j i i
i j i j i i i j i i
R
i
iq q ie e ie q iq e
j
i iq q iq iq ie e ie iq iq e
q U U U U
q
p c D c D U c D U


     
w    '  w
­ ½° °     '® ¾° °¯ ¿
  (6) 
where 2 0
i i i i i iiq q ie e iq e
U U U'   !
 by the concavity of the objective function. The term in 
square brackets in (6) LV WKHGLUHFW HIIHFW RI WKH ULYDO¶VTXDOLW\ RQ WKHPDUJLQDOSURILW IURP
KLJKHUTXDOLW\,WLVQRWREYLRXVZKHWKHUDQLQFUHDVHLQULYDO¶VTXDOLW\UHGXFHVRULQFUHDVHVWKH
marginal gain in patient numbers from higher quality. Suppose for simplicity that i jiq qD  is 
zero. The second part of the square bracketed term is the reduction in the variable cost 
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EHFDXVHWKHLQFUHDVHLQULYDO¶VTXDOLW\UHGXFHVGHPDQGDQGVRWKHPDUJLQDOFRVWRIRXWSXWRI
hospital i, which then responds by increasing quality. However, the second term in the curly 
bracket shows that the lower demand also reduces incentives to contain costs (indirect effect) 
and so variable cost may increase, making increases in quality to attract additional patients 
less profitable. 
 METHODS 
We investigate ZKHWKHUKRVSLWDOV¶TXDOLW\RUHIILFLHQF\UHVSRQGVWRWKHTXDOLW\RUHIILFLHQF\
of their rivals estimating cross-sectional linear versions of the reaction functions by ML: 
 i ij j i ijy w y XU E Hc  ¦   (7) 
where yi is the quality or efficiency of hospital i (i  «I); yj is the quality or efficiency of 
hospital i¶VULYDO j (ji); wij are spatial weights, Xi is a vector of covariates including demand 
shifters (e.g. population density, proportion of elderly individuals), supply shifters (e.g. 
number of managers, proportion of consultants), hospital type (e.g. foundation trusts, 
teaching hospitals) and a constant; and Hi is the error term. In matrix form we estimate: 
 Y WY XU E H    (8) 
where W is the spatial weight matrix composed of the elements wij. The spatial weights are 
generated from the inverse distance function: 
 
1
   0      if     
      if   30 km  and  
   0      if   30 km  and  
ij ij ij
ij
i j
w d d i j
d i j

­  ° d z®° ! z¯
  (9) 
where dij is the straight line distance between hospital i and j. We assume, as in recent 
literature, that 30 km is the radius within which hospitals compete (Gaynor et al., 2012a, 
Bloom et al., 2015). Hospitals that are further away within a 30 km radius have a lower 
weight, and hospitals that are further than 30 km have a zero weight. The weight matrix W is 
row standardised, i.e. the elements of each row sum to one. WY  is therefore a weighted 
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average of the ULYDOV¶TXDOLW\RUHIILFLHQF\ 
The key coefficient is U. If U > 0 then quality (efficiency) increases in response to an 
LQFUHDVH LQ ULYDOV¶TXDOLW\ (efficiency). But there are two other potential reasons for spatial 
correlation in outcomes. First, a hospiWDO¶V TXDOLW\ PD\ YDU\ ZLWK FKDUDFWHULVWLFV of rival 
hospitals, such as proportion of foundation trusts amongst rivals. Second, unobserved 
characteristics common across rival hospitals may affect quality in a given area. For instance, 
rival hospitals with appealing neighbourhoods are more likely to attract and employ skilled 
doctors and managers, and provide similar quality. If we fail to account for these factors, 
spatial correlation will be spurious. 
There is an analogy between our spatial approach and the peer-effects literature where the 
identification issue is known DV WKH ³reflection problem´ (Manski, 1993). Strategic 
interactions amongst hospitals, DVFDSWXUHGE\WKHULYDOV¶TXDOLW\RUHIILFLHQF\WY), are the 
endogenous effects of the peer-effects literature. Observed characteristics of rival hospitals 
(WX) are the contextual effects and unobserved hospital characteristics similar across rivals 
are correlated effects contained in the error term H. 
To control for time-invariant unobserved factors, we estimate spatial panel models using 
the fixed (FE) or random-effects (RE) ML estimator:1 
 it ij jt it i t itjy w y XU E D J Hc    ¦  (10) 
where Ȗt is a year indicator. The hospital effect Įi captures unobserved time-invariant hospital 
heterogeneity and will therefore potentially reduce time-invariant bias from contextual and 
correlated effects. Estimates, however, might still be biased in the presence of unobserved 
time-varying factors affecting the patient case-mix. For instance, patient comorbidities and 
                                                 
1
 We use the Stata user-written command spreg to estimate cross-sectional models (Drukker et al., 2015), and 
xsmle to estimate panel models (Belotti et al., 2014). 
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severity not captured by the risk adjustment may lead to higher hospital mortality rates. 
Risk-adjustment methodologies generally use routine patient data that reflect the information 
collected through DRG-type patient classification systems. Although such systems provide a 
large number of patient categories, there is recognition that they can only imperfectly capture 
patient complexity (e.g. Mason et al., 2011, Gutacker et al., 2013). Since patient 
comorbidities and severity vary over time, we cannot rule them out as a potential source of 
endogeneity.  
We test the robustness of our results in a number of ways. First, we estimate the spatial 
Durbin model (SDM) adding all the spatially lagged covariates (WX) to the cross-sectional 
and panel models. This will reduce potential bias due to contextual effects. Second, we allow 
for correlated effects which lead to spatially correlated errors by estimating spatial 
autocorrelation (SAC) models with spatially lagged errors: it ij jt itj wH O H [ ¦ . Third, 
following the theory in section 2ZHWHVWZKHWKHUDKRVSLWDO¶VTXDOLW\efficiency) responds to 
ULYDOV¶ HIILFLHQF\ TXDOLW\ E\ DGGLQJ D VSDWLDOO\ ODJJHG HIILFLHQF\ TXDOLW\ PHDVXUH WR the 
main regressions. We also examine whether results are sensitive to extending the radius 
within which hospitals compete to 60 km or 90 km. 
Finally, in cross-sectional models, to further address potential bias from contextual and 
correlated effects we use two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumenting WYt with its two or 
three year lagged value (WYt-2 or WYt-3). An instrument is valid (Stock and Watson, 2003, 
p.423) if it is exogenous (not a regressor in the second stage regression and uncorrelated with 
unobserved factors captured by the error term) and relevant (correlated with the instrumented 
endogenous variable). We argue that, whilst current outcomes are potentially influenced by 
ULYDO¶VFXUUHQWRXWFRPHVRUSRVVLEO\ ODVWSHULRGRXWFRPHV), adjustment is sufficiently rapid 
that current outcomes are not affected by what rivals were doing two or three years 
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previously. Some studies on the English NHS (Gaynor et al., 2012b, Sivey, 2012, Gutacker et 
al., 2016) show that patients choose hospitals with higher quality and lower waiting times. 
For example, Gutacker et al. (2016) find that the demand of a hospital decreases by 0.63% if 
a rival located within 10 km increases its PROMs quality by 1%. Hospitals are therefore 
XQOLNHO\ WR GHOD\ WKHLU UHDFWLRQ WR FKDQJHV LQ ULYDOV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH by two or three years in 
order to avoid reductions in the volume of patients treated and, hence, revenue. On the other 
hand, WYt-2 (or WYt-3) is likely to be relevant because hospital quality is unlikely to change 
rapidly over time so that WYt-2 (or WYt-3) will be a good predictor of WYt. We can also test for 
relevance in the first stage model. 
 DATA 
We have eight quality indicators and six efficiency indicators measured at hospital trust level 
and have four years of data (from 2010/11 to 2013/14, except for the readmission rate where 
we use data for 2008/09 to 2011/12).2 Such indicators are issued annually or quarterly in the 
public domain, with the most recent collection released in 2010 (patient reported outcome 
measures).3 They are therefore available to providers.4 
4.1. Quality indicators 
The risk-adjusted Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator (SHMI) is the ratio of the 
actual number of deaths from all causes in hospital or within 30 days of discharge to the 
number of deaths expected given the characteristics of patients. The expected deaths are 
                                                 
2
 Detailed definitions of the quality and efficiency indicators are included in the appendix (Table A1 and Table 
A2). The publication of the emergency readmission rate has been suspended because of a revision of the 
methodology. 
3
 The SHMI was published annually until 2011 and quarterly afterwards. Bed occupancy data were released 
annually up to 2009/10 and quarterly afterwards. Cancelled elective operations have been issued quarterly since 
their first publication in 1996/97. All other indicators have annual frequency. 
4
 The SHMI is only available for general hospitals but not for specialist hospitals. The reference cost index for 
hip replacement is not directly available as the other reference cost indexes. Its calculation, however, follows the 
same transparent methodology (Department of Health, 2014) and uses public data firstly released in January 
2011. 
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estimated through a logistic regression controlling for differences in patient case-mix. We 
also use risk-adjusted mortality rates for two emergency conditions (hip fracture and stroke), 
and risk-adjusted emergency readmissions for all conditions. These three indicators are 
calculated through an indirect standardisation methodology that multiplies the ratio between 
observed and expected events (deaths or readmissions) by the national rate of patients. The 
expected events are in this case the product between the number of patients for a provider and 
the national rate of patients for each risk-adjustment category (e.g. gender-age combination) 
summed over all categories. 
We use risk-adjusted average health change for elective hip replacement patients derived 
from PROMs (patient reported outcome measures) data. On the basis of the EQ-5D 
questionnaire (Brooks, 1996, Brooks et al., 2005), tKH FKDQJH LQ D SDWLHQW¶V KHDOWK LV
calculated as difference between the self-assessed health status of elective patients before and 
six months after their surgery. Clinical quality indicators and PROMs are available from the 
health and social care information centre (HSCIC).5 
We use three patient satisfaction indicators for overall experience, hospital cleanliness, 
and involvement in treatment decisions. Patients were asked to rate their hospital experience 
on a scale between 0 and 100, whereas 0 indicates extreme dissatisfaction and 100 complete 
satisfaction. The indicators are obtained by averaging the patient rates across hospitals and 
they are risk-DGMXVWHG XVLQJ SDWLHQWV¶ JHQGHU DJH HWKQLF JURXS DQG DGPLVVLRQ PHthod 
(elective or emergency). They are available from the annual NHS Inpatient Surveys 
conducted for the Care Quality Commission. 
                                                 
5
 The SHMI is adjusted for gender, age, admission method, year index, Charlson comorbidity index, and 
diagnosis. Hip fracture and stroke mortality are adjusted for gender and age. The emergency readmission rate is 
adjusted for gender, age, admission method, diagnosis, and procedure. The health change after hip replacement 
is adjusted for patient characteristics (e.g. gender, age, ethnics), initial health status, self-assessed health status, 
economic deprivation, comorbidity, procedure, and post-operative length of stay. 
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4.2. Efficiency indicators 
The bed occupancy rate is the ratio of occupied to available hospital beds (e.g. Zuckerman et 
al., 1994). We measure the rate of cancelled elective operations as the ratio of the number of 
cancelled elective operations for non-clinical reasons to the number of elective admissions 
(Rumbold et al., 2015). The reference cost index (RCI) compares DKRVSLWDO¶Vtotal costs with 
the national average total costs for the same HRG groups. A RCI greater than 100 indicates 
higher than average costs. We also use the RCI for elective and non-elective activity, and for 
hip replacement. 
4.3. Control variables 
Our control variables include demand and supply shifters. Demand shifters comprise: 
demographic variables such as population density and proportion of individuals aged 65 and 
over, which we calculate using annual mid-year population estimates; socioeconomic 
measures: proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals 
with a degree, and proportion of owner occupier households; and a measure of population 
health: proportion of individuals in good or very good health. Socioeconomic and health 
measures are computed using 2011 Census data for all small areas within a 15 km radius.6 
Supply shifters include: the number of managers, junior doctors in training as a 
proportion of total clinical staff, consultants as a proportion of total clinical staff, and the 
number of beds.7 Junior doctors in training are qualified doctors under postgraduate training 
at the start of their medical career. Consultants lead teams of lower grade doctors and are 
primarily responsible for patients. Increasing the proportion of experienced doctors is likely 
                                                 
6
 These areas (Lower Layer Super Output Areas) have on average 1,500 inhabitants and a minimum of 1,000. 
7
 The total clinical staff is the total number of doctors, nurses, and allied professionals (e.g. therapists, healthcare 
scientists, technicians). 
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to improve patient outcomes and possibly efficiency. 8  Information on hospital staff is 
collected from the HSCIC, whilst NHS statistics provide the number of beds.9 Finally, we 
control for type of hospital: foundation trust, teaching hospital, and specialist hospital. 
4.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table I has descriptive statistics. The number of hospital trusts varies between 106 (for 
hip fracture mortality rate) and 142 (for emergency readmission rate) across indicators. The 
sample size for each indicator is determined by the number of hospitals with at least one 
rival, and is constant over time because we use a balanced panel. Hospitals with no providers 
within a radius of 30 km (i.e. monopolists) are dropped because, by construction, they do not 
compete. In the case of the sample for overall patient satisfaction, 13% of hospitals are 
monopolists, 23% are exposed to low competition with one or two rivals, 38% are located in 
areas with three to nine rivals, and 26% have more than nine rivals (up to a maximum of 25 
rivals). 
The SHMI and the RCIs are on average 100 by construction. On average, patients 
undergoing hip replacement have an average health gain of 0.413 HRQoL and 79% of all 
patients report high overall satisfaction. 
The summary statistics for the explanatories are for the overall patient satisfaction 
hospital sample. Amongst the demand shifters, for example, 15.7% of individuals are over 65 
years old. 83 hospitals (62.9%) are foundation trusts, 24 (18.4%) are teaching, and 14 
(10.6%) are specialist. 
Since hospital catchment areas overlap by construction for hospitals with at least one 
                                                 
8
 Siciliani and Martin (2007) show that more consultants are associated with lower waiting times for elective 
care. 
9
 Data on hospital staff are available from 2010/11 onwards. The number of managers, the proportion of junior 
doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants are therefore omitted in the regressions for the emergency 
readmission rate to allow comparability between cross-sectional and panel models. 
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ULYDODKRVSLWDO¶Vdemand shifters are always strongly (above 80%) correlated with LWVULYDOV¶. 
In contrast, supply shifters have more variations across rivals. 
 RESULTS 
Table II has WKH UHVXOWV RI WKH JOREDO 0RUDQ¶V , WHVW IRU overall spatial correlation of the 
quality and efficiency indicators.10 Spatial correlation is significant (at 5% level) and positive 
for two clinical indicators (SHMI and emergency readmissions) and two patient-reported 
indicators (patient satisfaction on overall experience and hospital cleanliness). Its magnitude 
varies between moderate (0.150 for overall patient satisfaction in 2012/13) and high (0.528 
for SHMI in 2012/13). All four cost indicators have a significant and positive spatial 
correlation ranging between 0.150 (for RCI for hip replacement in 2011/12) and 0.483 (for 
RCI in 2013/14).11 
5.1. Regression results 
Table III reports the estimated spatial lag coefficient ( ÖU ) from the ML models for each 
quality and efficiency indicator after controlling for demand shifters, supply shifters, and type 
of hospital (full results with coefficients on the covariates are in Appendix Table A3 and 
Table A4). In the cross-sectional models, SHMI has positive and statistically significant 
spatial lag for two years. 10% lower SHMI (higher quality) in rival hospitals increases the 
KRVSLWDO¶V SHMI by 2.9% in 2010/11 and 2% in 2011/12. For other quality and efficiency 
indicators, we obtain a statistically insignificant or weakly significant (at 10% level) 
estimated spatial lag with a few exceptions (stroke mortality rate in 2013/14 and non-elective 
                                                 
10
 7KHJOREDO0RUDQ¶V,WHVWFDOFXODWHVWKHRYHUDOOGHJUHHRIVSDWLDODVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQREVHUYDWLRQV (Anselin, 
2013) ,W GLIIHUV IURP WKH ORFDO 0RUDQ¶V , WHVW ZKLFK SURYLGHV D PHDVXUH RI VSDWLDO FOXVWHULQJ IRU HDFK
observation (Anselin, 1995). 
11
 7KH ORFDO0RUDQ¶V , WHVWRQTXDOLW\DQGHIILFLHQF\ LQGLFDWRUV LQ DYDLODEOHXSRQ UHTXHVWKDV VRPH
evidence of spatial correlations for London hospitals. Other hospitals not located in London, however, also 
exhibit a positive and significant local spatial correlation. The majority of hospitals show an insignificant local 
spatial correlation. 
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RCI in 2010/11). 12  Overall, there is weak statistical evidence of spatial correlation in 
cross-sectional models. 
Unlike supply shifters and hospital type dummies, demand shifters play a major role in 
generating cross-sectional spatial correlation. Rival hospitals are indeed close neighbours 
sharing similar population characteristics. 
Table III also has estimates of the spatial lag coefficient after controlling for unobserved 
time-invariant heterogeneity with FE and RE panel data models. There is a positive 
statistically significant spatial lag for two of the quality measures (0.172 for SHMI and 0.110 
for overall patient satisfaction) and none of the efficiency models have statistically significant 
spatial lags.13 In sum, the cross-sectional and panel ML estimates do not suggest that hospital 
quality or efficiency generally depends RQULYDOV¶TXDOLW\RUHIILFLHQF\ 
5.2. Robustness and sensitivity analysis 
We also estimate the effect of the spatial lag WY  in SDM models with spatially lagged 
covariates and SAC models which allow for spatial correlation in the error term. The SDM 
results in Table IV are broadly similar to those in Table III. Once we allow for possible 
contextual effects with spatially lagged covariates the only hospital outcome variable which 
is correlated with rival outcomes is SHMI. When we instead allow possible correlated effects 
with the SAC specification (Table V) we again find that SHMI is the only quality indicator 
spatially correlated with rivals. However, two of the six efficiency measures (cancelled 
elective procedures, elective reference cost index) are negatively correlated with those of 
                                                 
12
 We also test the robustness of our results for bed occupancy rate and the RCI to risk-adjustment by controlling 
for proportion of male patients, patient age, and proportion of emergency admissions in equation (7) and (10). 
The results (available upon request) remain similar to those reported in Table III. 
13
 Results for cross-sectional and panel models also mirror WKHJOREDO0RUDQ¶V,WHVWRQWKHUHVLGXDOV Residuals 
are obtained from a linear regression, estimated by OLS, including all controls except the spatial lag of the 
dependent variable. Results are available on request. 
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rivals. 
Likelihood ratio tests (reported in the Appendix Table A5) suggest that adding the spatial 
lags of covariates (the SDM specification) only improves model fit for overall patient 
satisfaction and the rate of cancelled elective operations. The SAC model only improves the 
fit in the case of cancelled elective operations. Thus, overall, allowing for contextual or 
correlated effects with SDM or SAC models does not change the results from the simpler 
specification.14 
We also test ZKHWKHU D KRVSLWDO¶V TXDOLW\ HIILFLHQF\ UHVSRQGV WR ULYDOV¶ HIILFLHQF\
(quality) by adding spatial lags of efficiency (quality) to the baseline model.15 Results in 
Table VI are similar to those in Table III in respect of the effect of ULYDOV¶ quality (efficiency) 
on hospital quality (efficiency). In addition, and in line with our theoretical predictions, we do 
QRWJHQHUDOO\REVHUYHDQHIIHFWRIULYDOV¶HIILFLHQF\RQDKRVSLWDO¶VTXDOLW\ (Appendix Table 
A6) 2XU WKHRU\ PRGHO GRHV KRZHYHU LPSO\ WKDW ULYDOV¶ TXDOLW\ FRXOG affect hospital 
efficiency and we find some weak evidence for this (Appendix Table A7). For instance, 
KLJKHU ULYDOV¶ TXDOLW\ DV PHDVXUHG E\ WKH 6+0, LV VLJQLILFDQWO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK EHWWHU
efficiency, as measured by the non-elective RCI, in 2010/11, 2011/12, and 2012/13. 
However, this association is only weakly significant (at 10% level) in 2013/14 and disappears 
in the panel model. 
5.3. IV results 
Table VII has the results from 2SLS cross-sectional models instrumenting the spatial lags of 
quality or efficiency with their temporal spatial lags WYt-2 or WYt-3. The instruments appear 
                                                 
14
 We also find that expanding the catchment areas to 60 km or 90 km from 30 km does not change the results of 
the baseline models reported in Table III. Results are available on request. 
15
 We use rLYDOV¶ EHG RFFXSDQF\ UDWH DQG UHIHUHQFH FRVW LQGH[ DV PHDVXUHV RI ULYDOV¶ HIILFLHQF\ DQG ULYDOV¶
6+0,DQGRYHUDOOSDWLHQWVDWLVIDFWLRQDVPHDVXUHVRIULYDOV¶TXDOLW\ 
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relevant in that they have first stage F statistics greater than 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997). The 
IV estimates also suggest little evidence of strategic interactions across hospitals in quality or 
efficiency: the spatial lag is significant at 5% level for only the SHMI in 2012-13 and the 
emergency readmissions in 2013-14. 
The results in our study are compatible with those reported in Gravelle et al. (2014b), 
who analyse sixteen quality indicators for English hospitals in 2009/10 through a spatial lag 
model estimated by ML. The two studies have five indicators in common: three mortality 
indicators (overall mortality, hip fracture and stroke mortality) and two patient satisfaction 
indicators (satisfaction with hospital cleanliness and decision involvement).16  Table VIII 
provides a direct comparison of the results. If we compare results from Gravelle et al. 
(2014b) in 2009/10 with ours in 2010/11 and 2011/12 (the two closest years), the spatial lag 
is significant for overall mortality and it is insignificant for hip fracture mortality in both 
studies. The stroke mortality spatial lag is weakly significant in Gravelle et al. (2014b) and 
insignificant in our study. The results for the patient satisfaction indicators differ. They are 
significant or weakly significant in Gravelle et al. (2014b) but insignificant in our model. The 
differences may be due to the different sample years and, in the case of satisfaction with 
decision involvement, to the inclusion of additional demand shifters.17 
 CONCLUSIONS 
We investigated ZKHWKHUDKRVSLWDO¶VTXDOLW\RUefficiency responds to an increase in quality 
or efficiency of its rivals. We test for unconditional spatial correlation using the global 
                                                 
16
 Gravelle et al. (2014b) explore the spatial dependence for other indicators not included in this study. Amongst 
these, they find a positive and significant spatial correlation for hip replacement readmissions and patient 
satisfaction on trust in the doctors. No (or weak) spatial dependence is instead observed for mortality from high 
and low risk conditions, deaths after surgery, hip replacement and stroke readmissions, hip and knee revisions, 
operations within two days from hip fracture, and redo rates for prostate resection. 
17
 The additional demand shifters are: proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of individuals 
employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion owner occupier households, 
and proportion of individuals in good or very good health. 
 19 
 
0RUDQ¶V , WHVW DQG ILQG strong evidence of positive spatial correlation for four of the eight 
quality and four of the six efficiency indicators. But when we estimate ML spatial 
cross-sectional models that include covariates potentially affecting hospital demand and 
costs, we no longer observe statistically significant spatial dependence for most indicators. 
Only for overall hospital mortality there is VLJQLILFDQW FRUUHODWLRQ ZLWK ULYDOV¶ TXDOLW\
Similarly, we observe little evidence of spatial dependence, except for overall mortality, after 
controlling for unobserved time-invariant hospital heterogeneity in ML spatial panel models. 
Finally, after instrumenting the spatial lags of quality and efficiency by their temporal lags, 
we again find little evidence of spatial dependence. Hospital quality (efficiency), therefore, 
does not appear to respond to the quality (efficiency) of neighbouring hospitals. 
In conclusion, our empirical analysis suggests the absence of hospital spillovers in quality 
and efficiency. The results are in line with our theoretical model, which shows that 
efficiencies are strategic independent. The model also implies that whether qualities are 
strategic complements or substitutes is in principle indeterminate. A hospital whose rivals 
have higher quality will, ceteris paribus, have lower demand and this may both reduce the 
marginal cost of providing quality but also weaken incentives to contain costs therefore 
reducing the price mark-up and the incentive to provide quality. These two effects may 
cancel out leaving quality XQDIIHFWHGE\ULYDOV¶TXDOLW\ 
The lack of hospital strategic interaction on quality is not incompatible with the recent 
empirical literature (reviewed in section 1.1) which shows that areas with less concentrated 
hospital market structure (more competition) increases quality in England (Cooper et al., 
2011, Gaynor et al., 2013, Bloom et al., 2015). For example, our model suggests that if the 
marginal cost of treatment is constant, then qualities are strategic independent. But in this 
scenario it is still the case that a market structure with a larger number of rivals increases the 
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demand responsiveness and therefore the marginal revenue from an increase in quality (so 
that equilibrium quality increases in the number of providers). 
These findings have policy implications. They suggest that policy interventions 
incentivising quality or efficiency at local level will not generate positive (or negative) 
spillovers to other hospitals. A local policy intervention, e.g. a Care Commissioning Group 
which introduces a pay for performance scheme in a hospital will change quality in that 
hospital but will not increase the quality in other nearby hospitals. Similarly, the adoption of 
a new technology which increases quality in one hospital will not necessarily spread out to 
other hospitals. In turn, this implies that there may be scope for policymakers to develop 
policies which encourage cooperation across hospitals. For example, in France a new policy 
tool was introduced in 2016 (Groupement Hospitalier de Territoire) to foster cooperation of 
public hospitals under which each hospital has to join a group associated with a teaching 
hospital, and can share activity, equipment, medical teams and a joint information system 
(Choné, 2017, Siciliani et al., 2017). 
The results have also implications for antitrust policies. Brekke et al. (2016) for example 
suggest that if two hospitals merge they will reduce quality and costs, and non-merging rival 
hospitals might also reduce quality if quality is a strategic complements. Our study suggests 
that hospital mergers will not induce other non-merging hospitals also to reduce quality or 
costs. Policy makers can therefore concentrate on evaluating just the immediate effects of a 
potential merger on the merging hospitals. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table I ± Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Obs Trusts Monop Mean 
Std. dev. 
Min Max 
Ov Betw With 
Quality indicator                   
     Clinical                   
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 476 119 20 99.9 10.0 9.5 3.5 53.9 124.8 
Hip fracture mortality rate (%) 424 106 19 7.2 1.9 1.4 1.3 2.4 14.6 
Stroke mortality rate (%) 444 111 20 17.4 3.2 2.4 2.2 9.8 32.7 
Emergency readmission rate (%) 568 142 20 11.1 1.4 1.3 0.6 5.1 17.2 
     Patient reported                   
Average health change after hip replacement 428 107 19 0.413 0.033 0.022 0.025 0.264 0.538 
Overall patient satisfaction 528 132 19 78.8 3.9 3.5 1.8 67.3 90.4 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 528 132 19 88.1 3.3 3.0 1.3 77.3 96.8 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 528 132 19 72.0 3.9 3.4 2.0 61.8 85.4 
Efficiency indicator                   
Bed occupancy rate (%) 536 134 18 87.0 6.5 5.7 3.0 58.3 98.7 
Rate of cancelled elective operation (%) 536 134 17 0.81 0.37 0.31 0.19 0.02 2.41 
Reference cost index 560 140 18 100.6 10.8 10.2 3.5 81.1 148.2 
Elective reference cost index 560 140 18 100.8 15.5 13.6 7.4 62.7 167.7 
Non-elective reference cost index 560 140 18 102.4 17.9 16.0 8.1 70.4 213.1 
Reference cost index for hip replacement 508 127 18 99.6 24.6 20.4 13.9 37.8 237.1 
     Control variable                   
     Demand shifter                   
Population density (1,000 indv/km2)       1.808 2.032 2.037 0.041 0.124 7.859 
Proportion of individuals aged 65 and over (%)       15.7 3.1 3.1 0.6 9.2 25.2 
Proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job (%)       70.0 2.9 2.9 0.0 63.9 76.7 
Proportion of individuals with a degree (%)       18.4 7.9 7.9 0.0 7.4 35.9 
Proportion of owner occupier households (%)       61.6 8.9 9.0 0.0 40.0 77.6 
Proportion of individuals in good or very good health (%)       81.5 2.9 2.9 0.0 75.2 86.8 
     Supply shifter                   
Number of managers (100)       0.66 0.44 0.43 0.11 0.04 3.59 
Proportion of junior doctors in training (%)       2.6 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.0 6.7 
Proportion of consultants (%)       6.3 1.1 1.0 0.4 2.2 11.7 
Number of beds (1,000)       0.631 0.342 0.340 0.042 0.014 2.025 
     Hospital type                   
Foundation trust       0.629 0.484 0.477 0.087 0 1 
Teaching hospital       0.184 0.388 0.387 0.038 0 1 
Specialist hospital       0.106 0.308 0.387 0.038 0 1 
Obs=total number of observations, Trusts=number of non-monopolist hospital trusts, Monop=number of monopolists, Ov=overall, 
Betw=between, With=within 
Descriptive statistics refer to the sample of providers with at least one rival. 
Descriptive statistics on control variables are calculated on the overall patient satisfaction's sample. 
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Table II ± Global Moran¶V,WHVWfor spatial correlation. 
Indicator 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 All years 
Quality           
     Clinical 
          
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 
0.516 0.460 0.528 0.507 0.487 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Hip fracture mortality rate 
0.160 0.134 -0.013 0.090 0.081 
(0.040)** (0.081)* (0.968)  (0.230)  (0.000)*** 
Stroke mortality rate 
-0.155 0.126 -0.073 -0.078 -0.040 
(0.067)* (0.079)* (0.421)  (0.387)  (0.060)* 
Emergency readmission rate 
0.163 0.235     0.165 
(0.009)*** (0.000)***     (0.000)*** 
     Patient reported 
          
Average health change after hip replacement 
0.053 0.089 0.037 -0.030 0.041 
(0.438)  (0.228)  (0.568)  (0.806)  (0.035)** 
Overall patient satisfaction 
0.210 0.202 0.150 0.116 0.158 
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.026)** (0.080)* (0.000)*** 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
0.154 0.128 0.160 0.208 0.164 
(0.022)** (0.056)* (0.018)** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
0.093 0.105 0.031 0.116 0.083 
(0.156)  (0.113)  (0.587)  (0.080)* (0.000)*** 
Efficiency           
Bed occupancy rate 
0.069 0.040 -0.098 0.009 0.004 
(0.277) (0.502) (0.195) (0.813) (0.720) 
Rate of cancelled elective operations 
0.155 -0.050 0.088 0.046 0.053 
(0.019)** (0.546) (0.172) (0.444) (0.002)*** 
Reference cost index 
0.440 0.425 0.426 0.483 0.439 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Elective reference cost index 
0.226 0.230 0.293 0.337 0.272 
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Non-elective reference cost index 
0.272 0.341 0.273 0.209 0.281 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Reference cost index for hip replacement 
0.189 0.150 0.196 0.260 0.201 
(0.006)*** (0.025)** (0.005)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Correlations computed with an inverse distance weight matrix of 30 km catchment area. Data on the emergency 
readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. The statistic in year 2012/13 and 2013/14 is therefore omitted. 
The statistic for all years is obtained using data from 2008/09 to 2011/12. 
p-values (in parentheses) are calculated assuming a normal distribution of the indicator 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table III ± Spatial lag coefficient. 
Indicator 
Cross-Section Panel 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 FE RE 
Quality             
     Clinical             
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 
0.285 0.203 0.108 0.145 0.172 0.184 
(0.002)*** (0.044)** (0.278)  (0.194)  (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Hip fracture mortality rate 
-0.025 0.119 -0.179 -0.156 -0.007 0.002C 
(0.831)  (0.297)  (0.116)  (0.184)  (0.896)  (0.976)  
Stroke mortality rate 
-0.172 -0.171 -0.174 -0.272 -0.056 -0.059 
(0.117)  (0.136)  (0.130)  (0.025)** (0.307)  (0.299)  
Emergency readmission rate 
0.070 0.137     0.100 0.130 
(0.483)  (0.140)      (0.055)* (0.010)** 
     Patient reported             
Average health change after hip replacement 
0.048 -0.029 -0.199 -0.163 -0.044 -0.024C 
(0.685)  (0.810)  (0.097)* (0.124)  (0.456)  (0.682)  
Overall patient satisfaction 
0.100 0.095 0.048 0.105 0.110 0.122 
(0.178)  (0.190)  (0.534)  (0.185)  (0.034)** (0.005)*** 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
-0.012 0.000 -0.061 0.086 -0.063 -0.023 
(0.898)  (0.998)  (0.497)  (0.313)  (0.261)  (0.647)  
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
0.024 0.048 -0.073 0.055 -0.023 0.016 
(0.778)  (0.561)  (0.398)  (0.543)  (0.668)  (0.740)  
Efficiency             
Bed occupancy rate 
-0.008 -0.015 -0.173 -0.079 -0.031 -0.023C 
(0.932)  (0.887)  (0.073)* (0.442)  (0.559)  (0.655)  
Rate of cancelled elective operations 
0.068 -0.157 0.032 -0.008 0.053 0.044C 
(0.476)  (0.151)  (0.749)  (0.934)  (0.289)  (0.380)  
Reference cost index 
-0.087 -0.079 -0.067 0.003 0.007 0.018 
(0.378)  (0.412)  (0.513)  (0.980)  (0.900)  (0.732)  
Elective reference cost index 
-0.003 -0.094 -0.051 -0.030 -0.039 -0.039C 
(0.973)  (0.323)  (0.612)  (0.776)  (0.447)  (0.437)  
Non-elective reference cost index 
-0.211 -0.108 -0.168 -0.121 -0.072 -0.060 
(0.037)** (0.248)  (0.092)* (0.287)  (0.185)  (0.251)  
Reference cost index for hip replacement 
-0.054 -0.117 0.067 0.085 -0.041 -0.021 
(0.626)  (0.332)  (0.532)  (0.448)  (0.474)  (0.707)  
ML estimation. Each cross-sectional regression controls for: population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, 
proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner 
occupier households, proportion of individuals in good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior 
doctors in training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. The 
panel model also includes year dummies. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of 
specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. Cross-sectional estimates in year 2012/13 and 
2013/14 are therefore omitted. Panel estimates are obtained using data from 2008/09 to 2011/12. In addition, data on hospital 
staff are available from 2010/11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the 
number of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants. 
C = the RE estimator passes the Hausman test at 5% level, and it is therefore consistent and efficient. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table IV ± Spatial lag coefficient with Spatial Durbin Model. 
Indicator 
Cross-Section Panel 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 FE RE 
Quality             
     Clinical             
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 
0.201 0.139 0.053 0.143 0.152 0.172 
(0.063)* (0.237)  (0.641)  (0.247)  (0.004)*** (0.001)*** 
Hip fracture mortality rate 
-0.073 0.045 -0.249 -0.197 -0.010 -0.009C 
(0.544)  (0.707)  (0.027)** (0.103)  (0.860)  (0.878)  
Stroke mortality rate 
-0.210 -0.181 -0.242 -0.246 -0.078 -0.056C 
(0.074)* (0.127)  (0.035)** (0.058)* (0.170)  (0.326)  
Emergency readmission rate 
-0.026 0.030     0.095 0.118 
(0.835)  (0.781)      (0.070)* (0.025)** 
     Patient reported             
Average health change after hip replacement 
0.056 -0.062 -0.233 -0.264 -0.048 -0.031C 
(0.639)  (0.633)  (0.076)* (0.024)** (0.422)  (0.599)  
Overall patient satisfaction 
-0.137 -0.122 -0.096 0.012 0.073 0.085 
(0.171)  (0.265)  (0.380)  (0.914)  (0.160)  (0.102)  
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
-0.076 -0.088 -0.137 -0.014 -0.060 -0.050C 
(0.507)  (0.438)  (0.240)  (0.906)  (0.293)  (0.371)  
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
-0.005 -0.052 -0.204 -0.084 -0.039 -0.019 
(0.959)  (0.629)  (0.061)* (0.454)  (0.473)  (0.725)  
Efficiency             
Bed occupancy rate 
-0.058 -0.050 -0.115 -0.123 -0.036 -0.023C 
(0.600)  (0.674)  (0.300)  (0.265)  (0.508)  (0.679)  
Rate of cancelled elective operations 
0.052 -0.209 -0.130 -0.076 0.030 0.041 
(0.596)  (0.061)* (0.246)  (0.487)  (0.553)  (0.415)  
Reference cost index 
-0.174 -0.153 -0.104 -0.091 -0.004 0.002 
(0.118)  (0.182)  (0.358)  (0.434)  (0.934)  (0.968)  
Elective reference cost index 
0.018 -0.105 -0.095 -0.161 -0.038 -0.040C 
(0.870)  (0.314)  (0.396)  (0.171)  (0.450)  (0.447)  
Non-elective reference cost index 
-0.283 -0.218 -0.268 -0.194 -0.076 -0.089 
(0.009)*** (0.050)* (0.012)** (0.101)  (0.160)  (0.104)  
Reference cost index for hip replacement 
-0.199 -0.191 0.056 0.014 -0.058 -0.048 
(0.092)* (0.110)  (0.636)  (0.909)  (0.288)  (0.388)  
ML estimation. Each cross-sectional regression controls for: population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, 
proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner 
occupier households, proportion of individuals in good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior 
doctors in training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. The 
Spatial Durbin Model includes the spatial lag of all regressors. The panel model also includes year dummies. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of 
specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. Cross-sectional estimates in year 2012/13 and 
2013/14 are therefore omitted. Panel estimates are obtained using data from 2008/09 to 2011/12. In addition, data on hospital 
staff are available from 2010/11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the 
number of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants. 
C = the RE estimator passes the Hausman test at 5% level, and it is therefore consistent and efficient. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table V ± Spatial lag coefficient with spatially correlated disturbances (SAC model). 
Indicator Spatial lag 
Cross-Section Panel 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 FE 
Quality 
 
          
     Clinical             
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 
ʌ 0.331** 0.108 0.240 0.085 0.345*** 
Ȝ -0.080 0.154 -0.198 0.105 -0.204 
Hip fracture mortality rate 
ʌ 0.133 0.045 0.193 0.239 -0.298* 
Ȝ -0.215 0.095 -0.450** -0.429** 0.275* 
Stroke mortality rate 
ʌ 0.099 -0.063 -0.293 -0.243 -0.009 
Ȝ -0.341 -0.132 0.145 -0.047 -0.051 
Emergency readmission rate 
ʌ 0.160 0.360***     0.051 
Ȝ -0.152 -0.348**     0.052 
     Patient reported             
Average health change after hip replacement 
ʌ -0.104 -0.001 -0.135 -0.017 0.012 
Ȝ 0.193 -0.044 -0.093 -0.208 -0.063 
Overall patient satisfaction 
ʌ 0.224*** 0.117 0.097 0.033 0.199 
Ȝ -0.342** -0.082 -0.107 0.142 -0.100 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
ʌ -0.016 0.051 0.005 0.140 -0.027 
Ȝ 0.007 -0.093 -0.124 -0.095 -0.039 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
ʌ -0.089 0.025 0.056 0.102 -0.093 
Ȝ 0.189 0.043 -0.202 -0.080 0.071 
Efficiency 
 
          
Bed occupancy rate 
ʌ 0.348** 0.006 -0.410*** -0.076 0.059 
Ȝ -0.417** -0.030 0.295* -0.004 -0.099 
Rate of cancelled elective operations 
ʌ 0.549*** -0.013 0.418*** 0.389*** -0.474*** 
Ȝ -0.570*** -0.170 -0.510*** -0.507*** 0.491*** 
Reference cost index 
ʌ 0.043 0.042 0.012 0.101 0.017 
Ȝ -0.219 -0.225 -0.124 -0.166 -0.012 
Elective reference cost index 
ʌ -0.215 0.086 0.083 0.107 -0.374*** 
Ȝ 0.261 -0.221 -0.192 -0.223 0.336*** 
Non-elective reference cost index 
ʌ 0.002 0.093 0.055 -0.013 -0.171 
Ȝ -0.304* -0.341** -0.315* -0.175 0.114 
Reference cost index for hip replacement 
ʌ 0.122 -0.032 0.048 0.150 -0.066 
Ȝ -0.267 -0.117 0.038 -0.085 -0.001 
ML estimation. Each cross-sectional regression controls for: population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, 
proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier 
households, proportion of individuals in good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in 
training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. The panel model 
also includes year dummies. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of 
specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. Cross-sectional estimates in year 2012/13 and 
2013/14 are therefore omitted. Panel estimates are obtained using data from 2008/09 to 2011/12. In addition, data on hospital 
staff are available from 2010/11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the number 
of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants. 
The p-value is omitted. *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table VI ± Spatial lag coefficient with additional spatial lags of quality or efficiency. 
Indicator 
Cross-Section Panel 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 FE RE 
Quality             
     Clinical             
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 
0.212 0.159 0.098 0.156 0.170 0.181 
(0.043)** (0.130)  (0.328)  (0.164)  (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Hip fracture mortality rate 
0.016 0.094 -0.199 -0.205 -0.040 -0.021C 
(0.891)  (0.403)  (0.085)* (0.083)* (0.468)  (0.710)  
Stroke mortality rate 
-0.156 -0.176 -0.189 -0.305 -0.060 -0.057C 
(0.156)  (0.132)  (0.097)* (0.013)** (0.279)  (0.316)  
Emergency readmission rate 
0.091 0.092     0.065 0.114 
(0.327)  (0.351)      (0.233)  (0.028)** 
     Patient reported             
Average health change after hip replacement 
-0.006 -0.064 -0.157 -0.195 -0.039 -0.035C 
(0.958)  (0.606)  (0.207)  (0.082)* (0.505)  (0.557)  
Overall patient satisfaction 
0.047 0.061 0.003 0.084 0.084 0.092 
(0.568)  (0.460)  (0.971)  (0.349)  (0.113)  (0.052)* 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
-0.016 -0.054 -0.082 0.044 -0.069 -0.045 
(0.873)  (0.565)  (0.371)  (0.624)  (0.218)  (0.382)  
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
0.035 0.075 -0.130 0.029 -0.032 -0.001 
(0.719)  (0.405)  (0.163)  (0.761)  (0.552)  (0.986)  
Efficiency             
Bed occupancy rate 
-0.054 -0.114 -0.097 0.049 -0.090 -0.053C 
(0.619)  (0.333)  (0.401)  (0.641)  (0.136)  (0.367)  
Rate of cancelled elective operations 
0.084 -0.024 0.125 0.040 0.018 0.050 
(0.424)  (0.839)  (0.246)  (0.713)  (0.736)  (0.353)  
Reference cost index 
0.016 0.034 0.030 -0.049 0.046 0.059 
(0.886)  (0.757)  (0.787)  (0.682)  (0.430)  (0.297)  
Elective reference cost index 
0.016 0.034 0.030 -0.049 0.046 0.059 
(0.886)  (0.757)  (0.787)  (0.682)  (0.430)  (0.297)  
Non-elective reference cost index 
-0.064 -0.081 -0.145 -0.018 -0.076 0.025 
(0.572)  (0.468)  (0.189)  (0.884)  (0.179)  (0.647)  
Reference cost index for hip replacement 
-0.122 -0.187 -0.012 0.068 -0.107 -0.070 
(0.287)  (0.092)* (0.919)  (0.555)  (0.058)* (0.212)  
ML estimation. Each cross-sectional regression controls for: population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, 
proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner 
occupier households, proportion of individuals in good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior 
doctors in training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. The 
efficiency indicators added to the regressions for the quality indicators are bed occupancy rate and RCI. The quality 
indicators added to the regressions for the efficiency indicators are SHMI and overall patient satisfaction. The panel model 
also includes year dummies. 
In the regressions including SHMI, hip fracture and stroke mortality as dependent or independent variable, the specialist 
dummy is omitted because of the absence of specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. Cross-sectional estimates in year 2012/13 and 
2013/14 are therefore omitted. Panel estimates are obtained using data from 2008/09 to 2011/12. In addition, data on 
hospital staff are available from 2010/11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include 
the number of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants. 
C = the RE estimator passes the Hausman test at 5% level, and it is therefore consistent and efficient. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table VII ± Spatial lag coefficient. IV estimates. 
Indicator 
WYt-2   WYt-3 
2012/13 2013/14   2013/14 
Quality         
     Clinical         
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 
0.421 0.419   0.519 
(0.026)** (0.069)*   (0.090)* 
Hip fracture mortality rate 
-0.092 0.389   -0.035 
(0.820)  (0.189)    (0.939) 
Emergency readmission rate 
0.321 0.313   0.307 
(0.065)* (0.048)**   (0.087)* 
     Patient reported         
Overall patient satisfaction 
0.123 0.097   0.089 
(0.281)  (0.385)    (0.467) 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
0.034 0.126   0.155 
(0.799)  (0.276)    (0.218) 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
0.068 0.196   0.266 
(0.654)  (0.162)    (0.081)* 
Efficiency         
Bed occupancy rate 
-0.042 0.095   0.0003 
(0.807)  (0.568)    (0.999) 
Rate of cancelled elective operations 
0.315 -0.226   -0.074 
(0.286)  (0.231)    (0.792) 
Reference cost index 
-0.124 -0.056   -0.110 
(0.526)  (0.727)    (0.518) 
Elective reference cost index 
0.116 0.069   0.027 
(0.758)  (0.771)    (0.920) 
Non-elective reference cost index 
-0.057 -0.175   -0.339 
(0.780)  (0.530)    (0.272) 
Reference cost index for hip replacement 
0.524 0.660   0.625 
(0.074)* (0.168)    (0.109)  
IV estimation. The first-stage F statistic for each specification and outcome indicator is reported in parenthesis 
following the same order of the table (WYt-2 in 2012/13; WYt-2 in 2013/14; WYt-3 in 2013/14): SHMI (94.49; 95.69; 
39.70), hip fracture mortality rate (16.58; 52.46; 14.30), emergency readmission rate (140.68; 168.39; 101.60), 
overall patient satisfaction (175.89; 261.03; 159.30), patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness (282.66; 467.54; 
234.30), patient satisfaction on decision involvement (100.42; 216.06; 145.80), bed occupancy rate (85.14; 
135.99; 103.92), rate of cancelled elective operations (30.46; 105.08; 35.54), reference cost index (87.65; 206.49; 
164.61), elective reference cost index (16.29; 56.77; 50.91), non-elective reference cost index (60.16; 59.51; 
42.62), reference cost index for hip replacement (44.49; 13.39; 31.14). 
Each regression controls for: population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of 
individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier 
households, proportion of individuals in good/very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors 
in training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the 
absence of specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. The estimate refers to the latest 
available years (2010/11 or 2011/12) and not to 2012/13 or 2013/14. 
For stroke mortality and average health change after hip replacement, estimates are omitted because of the 
absence of a relevant instrument. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table VIII ± Comparison with results in Gravelle et al. (2014b). 
Indicator 
  GSS (2014)   Our study 
  2009/10   2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 
Overall mortality 
(1) 0.276   0.377 0.260 0.162 0.241 (0.004)***   (0.000)*** (0.008)*** (0.106)  (0.027)** 
(2) 0.234   0.314 0.214 0.105 0.173 (0.019)**   (0.001)*** (0.036)** (0.304)  (0.119)  
Hip fracture mortality rate 
(1) 0.028   0.118 0.103 -0.121 -0.105 (0.807)    (0.286)  (0.374)  (0.283)  (0.370)  
(2) -0.066   -0.019 0.093 -0.218 -0.203 (0.580)    (0.868)  (0.422)  (0.054)* (0.087)* 
Stroke mortality rate 
(1) 0.179   -0.037 -0.172 -0.123 -0.291 (0.100)*   (0.748)  (0.143)  (0.284)  (0.015)** 
(2) 0.147   -0.127 -0.203 -0.163 -0.316 (0.189)    (0.265)  (0.083)* (0.162)  (0.009)*** 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
(1) 0.179   -0.003 -0.015 -0.060 0.045 (0.070)*   (0.976)  (0.869)  (0.538)  (0.622)  
(2) 0.171   -0.045 -0.030 -0.111 0.009 (0.077)*   (0.633)  (0.740)  (0.248)  (0.918)  
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
(1) 0.245   0.092 0.068 -0.022 0.060 (0.012)**   (0.272)  (0.407)  (0.792)  (0.504)  
(2) 0.167   0.005 -0.038 -0.087 -0.031 (0.102)    (0.953)  (0.649)  (0.317)  (0.736)  
GSS (2014) = Gravelle at al. (2014b). Both GSS (2014) and our study's estimates are obtained by ML. While GGS (2014) 
use an inverse distance weight matrix with a 30 min travel distance threshold, we use a 30 km straight line distance 
threshold. 
Specification (1) controls for: number of rivals, teaching trusts, foundation trusts, specialist hospitals, number of patients, 
market forces factor, population density, London trusts. 
Specification (2) controls for all covariates in (1) and for: proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of 
individuals employed and looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier 
households, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of individuals in good and very good health. 
The specialist dummy is omitted if the quality indicator's sample does not include specialist hospitals, i.e. for all indicators 
included in Gravelle, Santos, and Siciliani (2014) and for SHMI, hip fracture and stroke mortality rate. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 ± Definition for the quality indicators. 
Quality indicators 
The Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator (SHMI) is a ratio of the observed number of deaths to the expected 
number of deaths for a trust (provider). The observed number of deaths is the total number of finished provider 
spells for the trust which resulted in a death either in-hospital or within 30 days (inclusive) of discharge from the 
trust. The expected deaths are estimated through a logistic regression controlling for age, gender, admission method, 
year index, Charlson Comorbidity Index and diagnosis grouping. A three year dataset is used to create the risk-
adjusted models. 
The hip fracture mortality rate captures deaths within 30 days (from 0 to 29 days inclusive) of an emergency 
admission to hospital with a primary diagnosis of fractured proximal femur (ICD-10 codes S720, S721, S722). It is 
indirectly standardised by age and sex. 
The stroke mortality rate captures deaths within 30 days (from 0 to 29 days inclusive) of an emergency admission to 
hospital with a primary diagnosis of stroke (all ICD-10 codes from I61 to I64). It is indirectly standardised by age 
and sex. 
The emergency readmission rate captures the percentage of emergency admission to any hospital in England 
occurring within 28 days of the last discharge from hospital after admission. The rate is calculated considering all 
patients aged between 16 and 74. It is indirectly standardised by age, sex, method of admission of discharge spell, 
diagnosis within medical specialties, and procedure within surgical specialties. 
Source: Health and Social Care Information Centre, NHS Digital Indicator Portal 
Link: https://indicators.hscic.gov.uk/webview/ 
The average health change after hip replacement is extracted from PROMs data. PROMs comprise a pair of 
questionnaires completed by the patient, one before and one after surgery (at least six months after for hip 
replacements). All patients, irrespective of their condition, are asked to complete a common set of questions about 
WKHLUKHDOWKVWDWXV7KLVLQFOXGHVVHFWLRQVDERXWWKHSDWLHQW¶VFLUFXPVWDQFHVSUH-existing conditions and the EQ-5D 
health questionnaire consisting of a five-dimensional descriptive system and a visual analogue scale (EQ-VAS). 
Post-operative questionnaires also contain additional questions about the surgery, such as how the patient perceives 
the results of the operation and whether there were any post-operative complications, such as bleeding or wound 
problems. Patients undergoing hip replacement surgery are also asked to complete a condition-specific section. The 
collected data are risk-adjusted for patient characteristics (e.g. gender, age, ethnics), initial health status, self-
assessed health status, economic deprivation, comorbidity, procedure, and post-operative length of stay. 
Source: Health and Social Care Information Centre 
Link: http://content.digital.nhs.uk/proms 
Patient satisfaction indicators are derived from the NHS Inpatient Surveys for the Care Quality Commission which is 
administered to a random sample of patients in all acute trusts. The variables relate to three questions to patients: 1) 
From 0 to 100, "Overall, how would you rate the care you received?" (Overall patient satisfaction); 2) From 0 to 
100, "In your opinion, how clean was the hospital room or ward that you were in?" (Satisfaction on hospital 
cleanliness)URPWR³:HUH\RXLQYROYHGDVPXFKDV\RXZDQWHGWREHLQGHFLVLRQVDERXW\RXUFDUHDQG 
WUHDWPHQW"´Satisfaction on decision involvement). The data has been standardised to adjust for these differences in 
patient-PL[XVLQJWKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VDJHJHQGHUHWKQLFJURXSDQGPHWKRGRIDGPLVVLRQHPHUJHQF\RU elective). 
Source: NHS patient surveys 
Links: http://www.nhssurveys.org/surveys , https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/patients-experience-using-
hospital-services 
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Table A2 ± Definition for the efficiency indicators. 
Efficiency indicators 
The bed occupancy rate is the ratio of the overnight occupied beds to the overnight available beds. For wards open 
overnight, an occupied bed day is defined as one which is occupied at midnight on the day in question. The number 
of occupied beds excludes any bed days of occupation by well babies. The number of available beds only includes 
beds in units managed by the provider, not beds commissioned from other providers. It excludes any beds designated 
solely for the use of well babies. Such data are available quarterly. 
The rate of cancelled elective operations is the ratio of the number of last minute cancellations by the hospital for 
non-clinical reasons to the number of elective patients. Last minute means on the day the patient was due to arrive, 
after the patient has arrived in hospital, or on the day of the operation or surgery. Elective cancelled operations are 
provided in each quarter. The number of elective patients is calculated as the sum of planned and waiting list 
admissions, where the admission is a finished admission episode, i.e. the first period of inpatient care under one 
consultant within one healthcare provider. The number of elective patients is published annually. 
Source: NHS statistics 
Link: https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/ 
The reference cost index VKRZV WKH DFWXDO FRVW RI DQ RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V FDVH-mix compared with the same case-mix 
GHOLYHUHGDWQDWLRQDODYHUDJHFRVW(DFKRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VUHIHUHQFHFRVWLQGH[LVFDOFXODWHGE\GLYLGLQJLWVWRWDOFRVWV
(unit costs × activity) by the expected costs (national average mean unit cost × activity). The reference cost index is 
computed separately also for elective and non-elective activity. Elective activity refers to patients whose admission 
to hospital is planned, including day case patients. Non-elective activity refers to patients whose admission is not 
planned, including emergency admissions and admissions for maternity, births, and non-emergency patient transfers, 
and requires staying in hospital for more than one day. The reference cost index for hip replacement is calculated 
selecting the HRG codes: HB11A, HB11B, HB11C, HB12A, HB12B, and HB12C. 
Source: Reference costs data 
Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/nhs-reference-costs 
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Table A3 ± ML estimates for the quality indicators in 2013/14. 
Regressor SHMI Hip fract. 
mortality 
Stroke 
mortality 
Emerg. 
readm. 
Health 
change hip 
repl. 
Overall 
satisf. 
Satisf. on 
cleanlin. 
Satisf. on 
involvem. 
 
 Spatial lag of the dependent variable 0.145 -0.156 -0.272** 0.137 -0.163 0.105 0.086 0.055 
D
em
an
d 
sh
ift
er
 
Population density -0.903 0.032 0.240 -0.052 0.009** 0.156 0.246 -0.058 
Proportion of individuals aged 65 and over -0.037 -0.268** 0.089 -0.216** 0.004*** 0.330** 0.322** 0.624*** 
Proportion of ind. employed or looking for a job 0.237 0.148 -0.109 -0.037 -0.001 0.044 0.058 0.080 
Proportion of individuals with a degree -0.397 0.052 0.060 0.031 -0.002* -0.069 -0.157* -0.073 
Proportion of owner occupier households 0.019 0.103* 0.041 0.002 0.0000 -0.086 -0.081 -0.196* 
Proportion of ind. in good/very good health -0.603 -0.541*** -0.164 -0.200 0.008** 0.147 0.043 0.279 
Co
st
 s
hi
fte
r Number of managers -1.797 -0.315 -1.606**   -0.004 0.435 -0.888 0.293 
Proportion of junior doctors in training 0.917 -0.016 0.637   -0.016*** -0.664** -0.587** -0.827** 
Proportion of consultants -0.605 -0.160 0.404   0.002 0.090 0.117 0.049 
Number of beds 2.667 -0.165 -0.767 0.362 0.010 0.578 1.357 1.272 
Ty
pe
 
Foundation trust 0.432 -0.224 -0.480 -0.049 -0.002 1.44*** 0.523 1.434** 
Teaching hospital -2.005 0.698 0.149 -0.160 -0.010 0.838 1.172 0.693 
Specialist hospital       -1.257*** -0.024 5.434*** 4.620*** 5.795*** 
 
 Constant 126.827*** 39.683*** 34.329* 31.199*** -0.067 56.281*** 75.031*** 43.391** 
Variance 42.184 2.058*** 8.212*** 1.422*** 0.001*** 4.094*** 5.156*** 8.019*** 
Observations 119 106 111 142 107 132 132 132 
ML estimation. Only cross-sectional results for 2013/14 are reported. Results for the emergency readmission rate refer to the most recent available financial year 
(2011/12). 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Estimates for the emergency readmission rate refer to 2011/12. Data on this variable are currently available up to 2011/12. Data on hospital staff are available from 
2010/11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the number of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in training, and 
the proportion of consultants. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A4 ± ML estimates for the efficiency indicators in 2013/14. 
Regressor Bed 
occupancy 
Cancelled 
operations RCI 
Elective 
RCI 
Non-elect. 
RCI 
RCI for hip 
repl. 
 
 Spatial lag of the dependent variable -0.079 -0.008 0.003 -0.030 -0.121 0.096 
D
em
an
d 
sh
ift
er
 
Population density 1.529** 0.043 2.06** 2.813** 1.754 0.590 
Proportion of individuals aged 65 and over 0.018 -0.010 -0.942** -0.831 -0.821 -0.140 
Proportion of ind. employed or looking for a job -0.215 0.016 1.341** 0.824 2.832** 2.623* 
Proportion of individuals with a degree -0.421** -0.027** 0.519** -0.234 1.045** 0.635 
Proportion of owner occupier households 0.143 0.007 0.526** 0.036 0.482 -0.723 
Proportion of ind. in good/very good health 1.194* 0.028 -1.474* 0.141 -3.247* -2.512 
Co
st
 s
hi
fte
r Number of managers 0.364 0.048 2.602 0.147 3.677 -3.900 
Proportion of junior doctors in training -0.051 -0.037 -0.398 1.164 0.205 1.974 
Proportion of consultants -0.237 0.028 0.489 0.406 0.839 -1.076 
Number of beds 1.123 0.010 -0.018 -4.200 3.977 11.189 
Ty
pe
 
Foundation trust -2.458** -0.145** -1.342 -2.186 -1.717 4.757 
Teaching hospital -1.148 0.170 0.614 2.456 0.087 -5.376 
Specialist hospital -5.618* -0.048 9.426*** 11.789** 21.428*** 25.155 
 
 Constant 11.159 -2.494 91.661** 41.426 129.643 135.915 
Variance 28.800*** 0.118*** 41.994*** 110.523*** 193.989*** 298.786*** 
Observations 134 134 140 140 140 127 
ML estimation. Only cross-sectional results for 2013/14 are reported 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A5 ± Likelihood Ratio test: spatial lag vs SDM or SAC model. 
Indicator Model 
Cross-Section Panel 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 FE RE 
Quality 
 
            
     Clinical               
Summary Hospital-level Mortality 
Indicator 
SDM (0.254) (0.047)** (0.298) (0.674) (0.090)* (0.539) 
SAC (0.687) (0.560) (0.419) (0.556) (0.363)   
Hip fracture mortality rate 
SDM (0.246) (0.024)** (0.011)** (0.638) (0.812) (0.149) 
SAC (0.348) (0.779) (0.078)* (0.189) (0.333)   
Stroke mortality rate 
SDM (0.589) (0.824) (0.098)* (0.492) (0.198) (0.459) 
SAC (0.201) (0.570) (0.524) (0.795) (0.766)   
Emergency readmission rate 
SDM (0.656) (0.092)*     (0.871) (0.884) 
SAC (0.659) (0.087)*     (0.816)   
     Patient reported               
Average health change after hip 
replacement 
SDM (0.010)*** (0.467) (0.792) (0.188) (0.679) (0.332) 
SAC (0.491) (0.831) (0.671) (0.408) (0.643)   
Overall patient satisfaction 
SDM (0.000)*** (0.002)** (0.173) (0.090)* (0.004)*** (0.013)** 
SAC (0.045)** (0.550) (0.509) (0.397) (0.726)   
Patient satisfaction on hospital 
cleanliness 
SDM (0.194) (0.386) (0.819) (0.909) (0.741) (0.797) 
SAC (0.968) (0.580) (0.431) (0.586) (0.793)   
Patient satisfaction on decision 
involvement 
SDM (0.001)*** (0.012)** (0.398) (0.103) (0.080)* (0.012)** 
SAC (0.453) (0.790) (0.353) (0.705) (0.815)   
Efficiency 
 
            
Bed occupancy rate 
SDM (0.711) (0.655) (0.768) (0.081)* (0.605) (0.687) 
SAC (0.200) (0.895) (0.184) (0.989) (0.616)   
Rate of cancelled elective operations 
SDM (0.940) (0.209) (0.020)** (0.005)*** (0.016)** (0.698) 
SAC (0.015)** (0.705) (0.035)** (0.075)* (0.001)***   
Reference cost index 
SDM (0.295) (0.530) (0.966) (0.613) (0.013)** (0.415) 
SAC (0.201) (0.151) (0.428) (0.338) (0.928)   
Elective reference cost index 
SDM (0.537) (0.270) (0.315) (0.142) (0.000)*** (0.072)* 
SAC (0.241) (0.504) (0.337) (0.231) (0.020)**   
Non-elective reference cost index 
SDM (0.058)* (0.256) (0.372) (0.222) (0.001)*** (0.170) 
SAC (0.121) (0.033)** (0.075)* (0.313) (0.324)   
Reference cost index for hip 
replacement 
SDM (0.128) (0.560) (0.885) (0.391) (0.246) (0.783) 
SAC (0.180) (0.632) (0.850) (0.675) (0.995)   
Null hypothesis: the spatial lag model is nested in the SDM or SAC model 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A6 ± Spatial lag model for the quality indicators allowing for spatially lagged efficiency. 
Variable 
  Quality indicators 
  SHMI Hip fract. 
mortality 
Stroke 
mortality Readm. 
Health 
change 
hip repl. 
Overall 
satisf. 
Satisf. on 
cleanliness 
Satisf. on 
involvem. 
Spatial lag 
20
10
/1
1 
0.212 0.016 -0.156 0.203 -0.006 0.047 -0.016 0.035 
(0.043)** (0.891)  (0.156)  (0.047)** (0.958)  (0.568)  (0.873)  (0.719)  
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.281 -0.044 0.161 0.022 -0.001 -0.078 -0.004 0.006 
(0.142)  (0.372)  (0.014)** (0.411)  (0.341)  (0.102)  (0.923)  (0.902)  
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
-0.154 0.014 0.002 0.033 -0.001 0.015 -0.067 0.031 
(0.420)  (0.775)  (0.972)  (0.132)  (0.060)* (0.745)  (0.116)  (0.502)  
Spatial lag 
20
11
/1
2 
0.159 0.094 -0.176 0.117 -0.064 0.061 -0.054 0.075 
(0.130)  (0.403)  (0.132)  (0.254)  (0.606)  (0.460)  (0.565)  (0.405)  
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.495 0.026 0.038 0.051 -0.001 -0.069 -0.079 -0.051 
(0.019)** (0.632)  (0.698)  (0.005)*** (0.133)  (0.171)  (0.071)* (0.323)  
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
-0.070 -0.067 0.017 0.017 -0.001 -0.037 -0.080 -0.090 
(0.723)  (0.196)  (0.846)  (0.438)  (0.383)  (0.444)  (0.058)* (0.070)* 
Spatial lag 
20
12
/1
3 
0.098 -0.199 -0.189 0.091 -0.157 0.003 -0.082 -0.130 
(0.328)  (0.085)* (0.097)* (0.327)  (0.207)  (0.971)  (0.371)  (0.163)  
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.551 0.0004 -0.057 0.018 0.000001 -0.063 -0.048 -0.102 
(0.004)*** (0.995)  (0.521)  (0.351)  (0.999)  (0.064)* (0.222)  (0.028)** 
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
0.040 -0.023 -0.137 0.008 -0.0004 -0.060 -0.089 -0.134 
(0.812)  (0.682)  (0.080)* (0.625)  (0.482)  (0.142)  (0.065)* (0.015)** 
Spatial lag 
20
11
3/
14
 
0.156 -0.205 -0.305 0.092 -0.195 0.084 0.044 0.029 
(0.164)  (0.083)* (0.013)** (0.351)  (0.082)* (0.349)  (0.624)  (0.761)  
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.180 0.024 0.106 0.021 -0.001 -0.039 -0.072 -0.095 
(0.352)  (0.590)  (0.212)  (0.362)  (0.371)  (0.312)  (0.080)* (0.064)* 
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
0.160 -0.040 0.059 -0.036 -0.0005 -0.026 -0.081 -0.061 
(0.378)  (0.346)  (0.465)  (0.092)* (0.367)  (0.550)  (0.084)* (0.296)  
Spatial lag 
FE
 
0.170 -0.040 -0.060 0.065 -0.039 0.084 -0.069 -0.032 
(0.001)*** (0.468)  (0.279)  (0.233)  (0.505)  (0.113)  (0.218)  (0.552)  
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
-0.051 0.004 -0.047 0.014 -0.001 -0.060 -0.027 -0.071 
(0.626)  (0.924)  (0.456)  (0.082)* (0.225)  (0.109)  (0.347)  (0.089)* 
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
0.049 -0.008 -0.116 0.009 0.0003 -0.006 -0.020 0.021 
(0.563)  (0.816)  (0.028)** (0.463)  (0.515)  (0.856)  (0.431)  (0.562)  
Spatial lag 
R
E 
0.181 -0.021 -0.057 0.114 -0.035 0.092 -0.045 -0.001 
(0.000)*** (0.710)  (0.316)  (0.028)** (0.557)  (0.052)* (0.382)  (0.986)  
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.091 0.015 0.004 0.018 -0.001 -0.060 -0.043 -0.067 
(0.374)  (0.622)  (0.933)  (0.044)** (0.093)* (0.025)** (0.083)* (0.031)** 
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
0.051 -0.007 -0.070 0.004 -0.001 -0.032 -0.044 -0.035 
(0.544)  (0.791)  (0.116)  (0.713)  (0.092)* (0.223)  (0.064)* (0.251)  
ML estimation. Control variables are identical to those in the main regression 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A7 ± Spatial lag model for the efficiency indicators allowing for spatially lagged quality. 
Variable 
  Efficiency indicators 
  
Bed 
occupancy 
Cancelled 
operations RCI 
Elective 
RCI 
Non-elect. 
RCI 
Unit cost 
of hip repl. 
Spatial lag 
20
10
/1
1 
-0.054 0.084 -0.029 0.016 -0.064 -0.122 
(0.619)  (0.424)  (0.806)  (0.886)  (0.572)  (0.292)  
Spatially lagged SHMI 
-0.021 -0.002 -0.256 -0.494 -0.615 0.00002 
(0.817)  (0.773)  (0.030)** (0.032)** (0.004)*** (0.548)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.639 0.006 -0.573 -0.966 -1.582 0.0001 
(0.026)** (0.785)  (0.090)* (0.172)  (0.014)** (0.221)  
Spatial lag 
20
11
/1
2 
-0.114 -0.024 -0.038 0.034 -0.081 -0.230 
(0.333)  (0.839)  (0.742)  (0.757)  (0.468)  (0.039)** 
Spatially lagged SHMI 
-0.113 -0.005 -0.157 -0.540 -0.415 0.00003 
(0.248)  (0.415)  (0.169)  (0.006)*** (0.037)** (0.239)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-1.083 0.003 -0.185 -0.627 -0.512 0.00009 
(0.000)*** (0.866)  (0.566)  (0.261)  (0.357)  (0.215)  
Spatial lag 
20
12
/1
3 
-0.097 0.125 -0.124 0.030 -0.145 -0.011 
(0.401)  (0.246)  (0.286)  (0.787)  (0.189)  (0.925)  
Spatially lagged SHMI 
0.037 -0.004 -0.088 -0.257 -0.367 0.00003 
(0.705)  (0.574)  (0.478)  (0.183)  (0.047)** (0.199)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.427 0.041 -0.259 -1.094 -0.714 -0.00010 
(0.242)  (0.120)  (0.579)  (0.131)  (0.308)  (0.325)  
Spatial lag 
20
11
3/
14
 
0.049 0.040 0.060 -0.049 -0.018 0.060 
(0.641)  (0.713)  (0.609)  (0.682)  (0.884)  (0.613)  
Spatially lagged SHMI 
-0.203 -0.009 -0.053 -0.274 -0.395 -0.00001 
(0.049)** (0.209)  (0.717)  (0.248)  (0.075)* (0.691)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.290 -0.026 0.035 -0.112 -0.299 0.00004 
(0.331)  (0.199)  (0.933)  (0.872)  (0.635)  (0.591)  
Spatial lag 
FE
 
-0.090 0.018 0.029 0.046 -0.076 -0.095 
(0.136)  (0.736)  (0.607)  (0.430)  (0.179)  (0.091)* 
Spatially lagged SHMI 
0.003 0.010 0.077 -0.051 0.077 0.00003 
(0.954)  (0.017)** (0.233)  (0.685)  (0.537)  (0.115)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.280 -0.006 0.050 0.403 0.434 0.00003 
(0.064)* (0.560)  (0.758)  (0.214)  (0.168)  (0.552)  
Spatial lag 
R
E 
-0.053 0.050 0.090 0.059 0.025 -0.069 
(0.367)  (0.353)  (0.103)  (0.297)  (0.647)  (0.220)  
Spatially lagged SHMI 
-0.031 0.003 0.024 -0.183 -0.171 0.00002 
(0.561)  (0.485)  (0.713)  (0.116)  (0.150)  (0.203)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.512 -0.001 -0.144 -0.025 -0.364 0.00003 
(0.001)*** (0.929)  (0.403)  (0.937)  (0.257)  (0.522)  
ML estimation. Control variables are identical to those in the main regression 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A8 ± First-stage estimates on the instrument and F statistic using quality indicators. 
IV Estimate   SHMI Hip fract. 
mortality 
Emerg. 
readm. 
Overall 
satisf. 
Satisf. on 
cleanliness 
Satisf. on 
involvem. 
Wt-2 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
20
12
/1
3 0.610 0.499 0.778 0.587 0.830 0.707 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 94.49 16.58 140.68 175.89 282.66 282.66 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
20
13
/1
4 0.560 0.489 0.875 0.621 0.940 0.794 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 95.69 52.46 168.39 261.03 467.54 467.54 
Wt-3 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
20
13
/1
4 0.393 0.320 0.796 0.600 0.880 0.784 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 39.70 14.30 101.60 159.30 234.30 145.80 
Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV size critical value = 16.38; Stock-Yogo 15% maximal IV size critical value = 8.96; Stock-Yogo 
20% maximal IV size critical value = 6.66; Stock-Yogo 25% maximal IV size critical value = 5.53 
Each regression controls for: population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of individuals employed 
and looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier households, proportion of individuals 
with a degree, proportion of individuals in good and very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in 
training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. Control variables are 
included in the first stage of the 2SLS estimator. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of 
specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. The estimate refers to the most recent available 
years (2010/11 and 2011/12). 
For stroke mortality and average health change after hip replacement, estimates are omitted because of the absence of relevant 
instruments. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A9 ± First-stage estimates on the instrument and F statistic using efficiency indicators. 
IV Estimate   Bed 
occupancy 
Cancelled 
operations RCI 
Elective 
RCI 
Non-elect. 
RCI 
RCI for 
hip repl. 
Wt-2 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
20
12
/1
3 0.641 0.484 0.594 0.271 0.525 0.437 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 85.14 30.46 87.65 16.29 60.16 44.49 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
20
13
/1
4 0.775 0.897 0.734 0.419 0.461 0.236 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 135.99 105.08 206.49 56.77 59.51 13.39 
Wt-3 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
20
13
/1
4 0.616 0.480 0.704 0.380 0.483 0.291 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 113.70 35.60 177.60 53.30 51.30 23.45 
Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV size critical value = 16.38; Stock-Yogo 15% maximal IV size critical value = 8.96; Stock-Yogo 
20% maximal IV size critical value = 6.66; Stock-Yogo 25% maximal IV size critical value = 5.53 
Each regression controls for: population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of individuals employed 
and looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier households, proportion of individuals 
with a degree, proportion of individuals in good and very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in 
training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. Control variables are 
included in the first stage of the 2SLS estimator. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
 
